Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Real Wars, Real Capabilities


Yesterday, a few people alerted me to this Time Battleland blog post, USMC: Under-utilized, Superfluous Military Capability, by retired US Army Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor. There’s not much to say, it’s an example of another Army take on Marine forces that simultaneously misunderstands both the Marine Corps and the Army.

Macgregor starts out with an old mistake: he assumes away an enemy capability. Avoiding this pitfall is one of the first things future military planners are taught at resident schools, like, say, the US Army Command and General Staff college, for example. Macgregor assumes that any enemy will not defend a beach because they will be blown up by US Navy and Air Forces, forgetting perhaps that well after the advent of aircraft and naval surface fires capable opponents could, and did, establish robust shore defenses.

His evidence is a strange list of complaints:

First, like the Marines ashore, Army airmobile and airborne forces are “soft targets,” extremely vulnerable to long-range air and missile attack, as well as heavy weapons in the form of self-propelled artillery, mortars and auto-cannon.
I’m not sure if Macgregor realizes this, but that description applies to all ground forces. An M1A1 Main Battle Tank can take a few standard artillery or mortar rounds. But any advanced anti-armor indirect fire is just as lethal to an Abrams as it is to an infantryman, the tank is just easier to find. Citing susceptibility to indirect fire as the definition of a “soft target” applies equally to any ground force. It’s not called the “King of Battle” for nothing.

Macgregor gets a few things right. Namely, that future enemies will shy away from defending beaches and instead focus on counterattacking the beachhead. This is certainly right, but it’s also, contra-Macgregor, exactly what current Marine doctrine expects the enemy to do. We just do not plan on attacking defended beaches anymore, we plan on bypassing them and attacking forces inland before they can counterattack. The Marine Corps figured this out in the 1980’s and has planned accordingly since.

What Macgregor is actually arguing against, poorly, is light infantry; he just uses Marine and Army Airborne forces as marionettes in an attempt to distract the reader from his thesis. This is a mind-boggling argument after eleven years of light infantry combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, even if he does dismiss those wars. It does not change the fact that they were fought and any future war will have a stability operations component.  One wonders if Macgregor wishes to take armored divisions into sandbrick hamlets on cordon and knock operations during Phase IV operations since they are apparently the only “hard targets” our ground forces employ. Even in conventional operations, light infantry provides vital reconnaissance and screening functions to heavy armored forces, as per both Army and Marine doctrine.

The article also betrays a profound ignorance of the joint force. All of the so-called weaknesses Macgregor points out are directed at a Marine infantry or Airborne unit alone as if they will never be supported by joint assets.. His statement that “most of today’s Marine force consists of airmobile light infantry” is just factually incorrect. Subjected to Macgregor’s doomsday scenario, any lone combat unit would be hard-pressed to function. Of course, that’s why neither the Marine Corps nor the Army ever employs units as such. A Marine battalion ashore takes with it artillery, armor, and aviation units in direct support and under a single commander. It’s also supported by naval fire support and joint air assets. The use of a variety of forms of combat power is known as combined arms. Check out this U.S. Army Command and General Staff thesis for a good explanation of combined arms. The reality is that while the Marine Corps may be built around light infantry, it never operates with light infantry alone. Macgregor claims that “Marines cannot confront or defeat armored forces or heavy weapons in the hands of capable opponents.” This might be true if Marines didn’t, you know, bring armored forces and heavy weapons of its own as they always do. In wars against capable opponents, such as those Macgregor is focused on, Marine and Airborne forces will not operate independently, but in support of those heavy armored forces that Macgregor fantasizes can gain access and win the war by themselves.

Macgregor’s myopic focus on a conventional war with a peer competitor causes him to ignore the other functions that the US military provides to the nation like humanitarian aid/disaster relief. Marine units afloat are specifically trained to conduct HA/DR on short notice and are normally the first responders on the scene. If hurricanes and earthquakes ever begin to employ ballistic missiles and self-propelled artillery pieces, Macgregor may have a case that a MEU is anachronistic. Until then, the Marine Corps will remain the best placed units to provide aid to disaster victims.

This analysis might pass for compelling in the feverish fantasy of a young child playing with GI Joe figures on his parents’ living room floor, but that’s the only scenario where a commander of troops would employ forces in the simplistic manner Macgregor argues against. Even math is against Macgregor. I’ve cited this before, but combatant commander requests for amphibious forces are perennially unfulfilled. Less than half of these requests can be met with the current force. That’s not the definition of a superfluous capability, but an overstretched one. While it’s true that Macgregor’s Tarawa strawman is unlikely to occur anytime soon, his “future war with real armies, air forces, air defenses, and naval power” will still be fought, in part, by real Marines and real Airborne units. Not by Macgregor’s toys.

23 comments:

  1. Warfare in the 21st Century has changed; clearly Col MacGregor has not.

    The real tragedy is that with some 4,300 of the American forces killed in Iraq were lost after Pres Bush's 'mission accomplished' photo op, MacGregor still doesn't seem to realize that Phase 1 operations might be the easiest part of the fight.

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  2. I like this well-crafted piece. It would be more effective in TIME's Battleland as a riposte. I recommend Mr. Friedman pitch this to the editor: Mark_Thompson@time.com

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  4. I'm not defending MacGregor, but I would be interested in the strategic and operational scenarios that the USMC believes justifies their unique force structures.

    In part my sense we're seeing more fallout from the absence of a credible National Security Strategy that clearly identifies the kinds of operations most likely, those 'worst case' operations that should drive force structures, and the kinds of operations where the US is willing to accept risk. In particular, where would a forced amphibious landing fit in such a National Security Strategy?

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  5. My rebuttal begins after his verbiage which is in " "

    1. "Real Wars, Real Capabilities"

    This is just a bald-faced lie. Friedman is trying to imply that the unsound nation-building the politicos have us doing now are "real wars"; NO THEY ARE NOT. They are fund-raising expeditions for Wall Street. Friedman should read some marine Smedley Butler before going to bed tonight instead of watching "The Sands of Iwo Jima" on DVD the umpteenth time.

    The irony is the the John Wayne movie is about a NATION-STATE WAR not unsound nation-building attempted by clumsy military bureaucracies.

    The USMc hardly has any "real" capabilities as we shall see.


    2. "Posted by Brett Friedman"

    He appears to be an ARTILLERY officer; what would he then know about MANEUVER? His bias would likely be towards FIREPOWER which would be
    the WRONG THING for not killing innocent civilians during a sub-national conflicts he is so quick to embrace. Friedman does not disappoint the expectations
    of firepower bias.

    3. "Yesterday, a few people alerted me to this Time Battleland blog post, USMC: Under-utilized, Superfluous Military Capability,
    by retired U.S. Army Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor. There’s not much to say, it’s an example of another Army take on marine forces that
    simultaneously misunderstands both the marine corps and the Army."

    More fluff from Friedman. Whaty other "Army" takes is he referring to? Sounds like this isn't the first time marine incompetence has been brought up and Friedman has
    a chip-on-his-shoulder.

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  6. 4. "Macgregor starts out with an old mistake: he assumes away an enemy capability."

    Friedman is just trying to reverse-engineer a need for marines flopping themselves onto beaches in the face of withering enemy fire.

    In actuality, Macgregor is being TOO NICE by saying we don't have to worry about defended beaches. I say we do because we no longer have naval Terrain Saturation Firepower with which to suppress--much less evict hundreds and thousands of AKM and RPG gunmnen camouflaged and dispersed near beaches that will wipe-out the current flimsy foot-slogging and truck hopping and Iowa battleship gunfire-less USMC.

    5. "Avoiding this pitfall is one of the first things future military planners are taught at resident schools, like, say, the US Army Command and General Staff college, for example."

    Has Friedman actually gone to CGSC? Then how would he know what is taught there? This is clearly a smart-ass disrespect of someone more qualified than himself.

    6. "Macgregor assumes that any enemy will not defend a beach because they will be blown up by U.S. Navy and Air Forces, forgetting perhaps that well after the advent of aircraft and naval surface fires capable opponents could, and did, establish robust shore defenses."

    Macregor again was being too nice; Friedman is too dumb to realize that heavily defended beaches with gunmen, dialed-in mortars and artillery and obstacles means NO NEED FOR THE USMC to throw itself against them. He wants to repeat the amphibious defeat at Gallipoli where the British were pinned down by suprior enemy fires--but with higher and more lethal technology.

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  7. 7. "His evidence is a strange list of complaints:"

    Again, Friedman being snide and rude without any justification. Sarcasm cannot make up for Friedman's lack of facts.

    8. "First, like the marines ashore, Army airmobile and airborne forces are “soft targets,” extremely vulnerable to long-range air and missile attack, as well as heavy weapons in the form of self-propelled artillery, mortars and auto-cannon."

    If the forces above are not in tracked, armored vehicles then they are indeed "soft" targets.

    9. "I’m not sure if Macgregor realizes this,"

    More snide sarcasm from Friedman. We will give him some of his own medicine back in the next statement.

    10. "but that description applies to all ground forces."

    I'm not sure Friedman realizes this, but ALL ground forces are NOT the same. See how he wears his own snide remark, in this case, fitting.

    11. "An M1A1 Main Battle Tank can take a few standard artillery or mortar rounds."

    "I'm not sure Friedman realizes this", but the Army uses more advanced and better armored M1A2 Abrams heavy tanks. Moreover, there is no "main battle" area with which to operate from; this isn't about fighting in the Fulda Gap. If Friedman is to criticize a thing, he better first understand it.

    Regardless, by his own admission, a M1 Abrams heavy tank that can "take" a few artillery and mortar rounds can also withstand infantry small arms fire AND CONTINUE TO TO MANEAVER--making forces that have them SUPERIOR to those that do not--particularly those on foot and in wheeled trucks who are turned into bleeding and flaming wrecks if they receive ANY enemy fire.

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  8. 12. "But any advanced anti-armor indirect fire is just as lethal to an Abrams as it is to an infantryman"

    Here, Friedman is using the sophistry (look word up, kid) of an exceptional weapon to overlook the common AKM and RPGs to try to make the heavy tank as equally vulnerable as a walking infantryman--which is patently absurd. Israeli infantrymen without tanks in 2006 were targeted by those "advanced anti-armor" weapons Friedman incompetently refers to because they are missiles of the direct-fire variety while they squatted in houses unable to maneuver unless at night. Being a marine artilley egotist Friedman wants to inject his branch into the debate when the facts are that most foreign militaries cannot afford to gadget bleed their economies dry by the iffy proposition of shooting guided artillery projectiles to try to steer them into moving tanks. Why do they need to invest in guided artillery when there are plenty of foot-slogging and truck-hopping marines willing to be fodder for their AKMs, RPGs and land mines?

    The point is the FIRST thing an intelligent military force must do is overcome the WW1 obstacle of massed, unguided fires by tracked, armored mobility. If the USMC can't overcome this, they will be dead long before they need to evade guided artillery shells.

    13. "the tank is just easier to find."

    Says who?

    Have we applied hybrid-elrectric drive and band tracks to our tanks? Infared camouflage? Tanks can be just as stealthy, and in some cases more stealthy than the walking infantryman--if we applied available technologies. Can a marine rifleman lay a large smokescreen to cover the movement of a battalion from his backpack?

    How is the USMC infantryman going to "hide" (concealment) from enemy high explosives attacks if he is where the enemy expects him to be (beaches, roads/trails) and can saturate entire map grid square's worth of terrain with unguided projectiles which will shatter their bodies and ignite their soft-skin wheeled trucks?

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  9. 14. "Citing susceptibility to indirect fire as the definition of a “soft target”

    We do not prescribe to this bogus definition of what a soft target is. Friedman is trying to move the goal posts beyong automatic weapons and RPG fires out to an absurd level to try to hide the fact that his vaunted marine foot slogger is significantly more vulnerable to the infantryman in a tank.

    Again, this is dishonest sophistry typical to the marine narcissist who cannot take ANY constructive criticism, hence no constructive reform in the USMC.

    15. "applies equally to any ground force. It’s not called the “King of Battle” for nothing."

    Friedman is trying to play the lawyer, war is a serious business of life & death, victory & defeat--making-up word excuses and attempting to hide fatal weaknesses by "we are all vulnerable to Friedman's egowagon" is not going to prevent men and women from being killed/maimed as they are today by the light infantry excuse-mongers.

    16. "Macgregor gets a few things right. Namely, that future enemies will shy away from defending beaches and instead focus on counterattacking the
    beachhead."

    Which is it Friedman? You just said earlier the enemy will defend beaches and Macgregor was wrong. Now you say they won't and Macgregor is right. Are you confused?

    17. "This is certainly right, but it’s also, contra-Macgregor, exactly what current marine doctrine expects the enemy to do."

    Friedman is talking out of both sides of his mouth at the same time. Macgregor was being nice by not addressing defended beaches. I will not be. Smart enemies will be camouflaged and dispersed and if any foolish marines land on their beaches they will direct all kinds of unguided but directed artillery and mortar fire on the bloated target foot sloggers and soft wheeled truck targets turning them into bleeding and flaming wrecks. They will pick off the rest with AKMs and RPGs and sit and laugh as marines drive into their land mines placed along roads/trails.

    18. "We just do not plan on attacking defended beaches anymore"

    Typical USMC laziness. The USMC egomaniac neither wants to study war nor do TANGIBLE things to prepare for it. How convenient.

    And when there IS NO UNDEFENDED BEACH AREAS to land, what will the USMC do?

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  10. Why, nothing!

    Just like what Macgregor pointed out in his essay--the marine loud mouth braggert will sit off shore and do nothing because it would be murder to send him in unprepared against defended beaches.

    What this means is all our enemies have to do is defensively prepare some beaches and they won't have to worry about any loud mouthed marines landing!

    They can instead mine and look-out prepare likely landing zones for the flimsy V-22s to come in and blast them out of the sky as they must slowly come to a stop or else flip-over due to vortex ring state.

    19. "we plan on bypassing them and attacking forces inland before they can counterattack."

    What happened to addressing what the enemy is CAPABLE of instead of what you want him to do?

    And how are these enemy forces camouflaged, dispersed and underground going to be attacked if we can't see them all? Are we going to send a Tomahawk land attack cruise missile at $1M a pop at every location where a man with an AKM or RPG is suspected?

    20. "The marine corps figured this out in the 1980’s and has planned accordingly since."

    The USMC hasn't figured anything out. The maneuver warfare reformers forced landing-where-the-enemy-ain't upon the USMC bureaucracy which accepted it as an easy panacea so they wouldn't have to expend much funds/effort at actual amphibious warfare, forced-entry capabilities like even the cash-strapped British were able to do in WW2 with their Hobart's Funnies engineering tanks which enabled them to advance farther inland and with less casualties than Americans without tanks were able to do at Omaha beach.

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  11. 21. "What Macgregor is actually arguing against, poorly, is light infantry;"

    "Poorly"--says who? Your facts?

    22. "he just uses Marine and Army Airborne forces as marionettes in an attempt to distract the reader from his thesis."

    How is pointing out light infantry inability to maneuver in the face of enemy fire a DISTRACTION when it IS HIS THESIS?

    23. "This is a mind-boggling argument after eleven years of light infantry combat in Iraq and Afghanistan"

    Friedman is attempting the False Consensus Effect; most competent ground maneauver professionals properly view the light infantry blood baths we have suffered in Iraq/Afghanistan as unmitigated DISASTERS. What's mind-boggling is his attempt to excuse away 60, 000 casualties, 30, 000 dead as some kind of success story.
    Walking and driving wheeled trucks into land mines along roads/trails is beyond disgusting.

    24. "even if he does dismiss those wars."

    Only Friedman is attempting to dismiss these wars by trying to con them by sleight of hand into successes--which they clearly are not.

    25. "It does not change the fact that they were fought"

    We are not forgetting the incompetent blood baths that Iraq/Afghanistan were and continue to be.

    26. "and any future war will have a stability operations component."

    Since when does a stability component mean we have to foot-slog and drive around roads/trails in vulnerable wheeled trucks into land mines and ambushes?

    27. "One wonders if Macgregor wishes to take armored divisions into sandbrick hamlets on cordon and knock operations during
    Phase IV operations since they are apparently the only “hard targets” our ground forces employ."

    Friedman attempting at a straw man badly; no one says an entire armored division has to be sent to a small operation against a village.

    Does Friedman even know the vehicular numbers for the unit called PLATOON?

    In case he doesn't a tank PLATOON is 4 vehicles.

    Minimum convoy size leaving the FOB is 4 vehicles.

    The tanks being employed in "stability operations" don't have to weigh 70 tons, they can even be LIGHT under 20 tons.

    Do the math, Friedman.

    Sub-National Conflicts (SNCs) do not demand we move around exposed on foot and in wheeled soft target trucks.

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  12. 28. "Even in conventional operations, light infantry provides vital reconnaissance and screening functions to heavy
    armored forces, as per both Army and marine doctrine."

    Don't know what non-sense excuse Friedman is trying to conjure up, but its CAVALRY units that are supposed to do recon and screening
    supposedly with greater mobility than the main body--not immobile light infantry. Must be reciting some bogus USMC BS here.

    29. "The article also betrays a profound ignorance of the joint force."

    The only "ignorance" seen is Friedman's.

    30. "All of the so-called weaknesses Macgregor points out are directed at a marine infantry or Airborne unit alone as if they will never be supported by
    joint assets.."

    How will SUPPORT by a "joint asset" make a marine on foot or in a truck armored? How will it make him cross-country mobile?

    Joint is yet another excuse to ignore inherent USMC weaknesses with an excuse that SOMEONE ELSE'S BUREAUCRACY will do their dirty work, so afterwards the marine loud mouth can call him a pussy supporter.

    31. "His statement that “most of today’s marine force consists of airmobile light infantry” is just factually incorrect."

    No Friedman is factually incorrect--if the USMC continues to tolerate Navy amphib ships without flooding well-decks than the ENTIRE USMC contingent will have to be FLOWN BY HELICOPTERS to shore, making them like-it-or-not "airmobile light infantry" if they don't take along any light tanks.

    32. "Subjected to Macgregor’s doomsday scenario, any lone combat unit would be hard-pressed to function."

    No, Macgregor is just reminding everyone that light units once pinned down by any enemy fire cannot maneuver and get hurt.

    33. "Of course, that’s why neither the marine corps nor the Army ever employs units as such."

    False. Remember Beirut? Mogadishu?

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  13. 34. "A marine battalion ashore takes with it artillery, armor, and aviation units in direct support and under a single commander."

    Ad hocery. Band-aid units attached to inherently weak marine infantry did not stop a mere truck bomber from driving into a building packed full of marines and blowing them to bits in 1983.

    35. "It’s also supported by naval fire support and joint air assets."

    Friedman is delusional. Puny 5" guns on flimsy navy ships that if blocked by enemy sea mines can't even get within range are not going to save the marine infantryman from his body and soft skin truck being blasted by more numerous enemies with AKMs/RPGs and dialed in mortars/artillery and land mines.

    36. "The use of a variety of forms of combat power is known as combined arms."

    Tokenism is not combining arms, its typical lying USMC BS to pretend to paper-over inherent weaknesses instead of solving them by actually tangibly changing.

    37. "Check out this U.S. Army Command and General Staff thesis for a good explanation of combined arms."

    Who is Friedman to quote from a school he never attended to Colonel Macgregor who not only attended but "graduated" from the school of combined arms combat in actual war operations in Iraq?

    Macgregor has actually done combined arms operations in combat; Friedman only talks about it from ignorance.

    38. "The reality is that while the marine corps may be built around light infantry, it never operates with light infantry alone."

    False. A few token units attached to light infantry does not compensate and excuse away its inherent weakness--hence the disaster in Iraq where the USMC was 6 days late reaching Baghdad stopped by mere gunmen with AKMs and RPGs. Saddam and subordinates escaped and a protracted guerrilla war followed. All because the USMC couldn't do maneuver warfare even in the face of mere rear guards.

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  14. 39. "Macgregor claims that “marines cannot confront or defeat armored forces or heavy weapons in the hands of capable opponents.” This might be true if marines didn’t, you know, bring armored forces and heavy weapons of its own as they always do."

    Again, the USMC does not actually combine arms beyond tokenism. The USMC's token armor (tanks) and heavy weapons did not stop a truck filled with high explosives blowing up their entire battalion headquarters. The USMC is full of con artists like Friedman trying to excuse away their weakness by some token attached units...the enemy is not fooled.

    40. "In wars against capable opponents, such as those Macgregor is focused on, marine and Airborne forces will not operate independently"

    If they are sent in with only token units with heavier weaponry they will indeed be sent in along independent missions and suffer the consequences as we have already seen in Nasiriyah in the 2003 invasion of Iraq with the USMC debacle there.

    41. "but in support of those heavy armored forces that Macgregor fantasizes can gain access and win the war by themselves."

    Here, Friedman both simultaneously NEEDS heavy forces to be around so he can claim his marines are not "too light" and at the same time condemns them for not being able to be there to gain access. Which is it?

    If tracked tanks can be there to gain access--especially the LIGHT ones what's Friedman's excuse for every Paratrooper and marine not being cross-country mobile in the face of enemy fire in one--like the Russian VDV and naval infantry do?

    There is no excuse.

    The USMC bureaucrat-created light infantry structure is too weak.

    42. "Macgregor’s myopic focus on a conventional war with a peer competitor causes him to ignore the other functions that the US military provides"

    Friedman's myopic obsession with some easy third world area to showboat weak USMC foot-sloggers from wheeled trucks has murdered thousands of our men and women; weakness is no way to gain confidence with the locals or to establish security; on the contrary weak infantry that can't take hits fires often in all directions the first time it receives any enemy fire, murdering innocent civilians and creating more rebels. Counter-productive isn't strong enough a condemnation here.

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  15. 43. "to the nation like humanitarian aid/disaster relief. Marine units afloat are specifically trained to conduct HA/DR on short notice and are normally the first responders on the scene."

    Ad hocery; send in REAL trained NGO professionals to handle civilian disasters not egomaniacs making excuses for "small wars" that small minds think they can somehow handle.

    44. "If hurricanes and earthquakes ever begin to employ ballistic missiles and self-propelled artillery pieces"

    We don't have to worry about Friedman's Lord of the Rings animistic fantasies, we have real human enemies who have ballistic missiles that will sink the bloated marines in their flimsy Navy surface ships who can mop them up easily without mirror images of Friedman--RPGs, AKMs and land mines will suffice.

    45. "Macgregor may have a case that a MEU is anachronistic."

    The MEU is too weak and obsolete. Moreover, its not needed. Not at the tune of 180, 000 mouths to feed a middle-class active duty income. Macgregor is but the messenger of this truth.

    46. "Until then, the marine corps will remain the best placed units to provide aid to disaster victims."

    Are you sure, Friedman?

    The "U.S. Disaster Relief Corps"? What Congressionally-mandated mission is that?

    What about the eCONOMIC disaster AMERICANS are suffering because the USMC bureaucracy has put us into national debt?

    If the USMC is sooooo concerned about relieving disasters, why not relieve the tax burden upon Americans for their amphibious ego club by cutting itself in half?

    Put your money where your mouth is.

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  16. 47. "This analysis might pass for compelling in the feverish fantasy of a young child playing with GI Joe figures on his parents’ living room floor"

    Sounds like an apt description for wannabe Friedman.

    48. "but that’s the only scenario where a commander of troops would employ forces in the simplistic manner Macgregor argues against."

    Simplistic is denying weaknesses through tokenism to subsidize laziness and then sending it into the real world and having its ass kicked: Beirut, Nasiriyah.

    49. "Even math is against Macgregor. I’ve cited this before, but combatant commander requests for amphibious forces are perennially unfulfilled."

    If the USMC cannot show up with a bureaucracy of 180, 000 its time to cut useless overhead.

    50. "Less than half of these requests can be met with the current force."

    You mean farce. 180, 000 man-slots is a bloated, inefficient bureaucracy.

    51. "That’s not the definition of a superfluous capability, but an overstretched one."

    Funny, how "overstretch" whines are seemingly endless when making excuses for an inefficient USMC bureaucracy.

    52. "While it’s true that Macgregor’s Tarawa strawman is unlikely to occur anytime soon"

    Wasn't Friedman the one starting this article off saying dismissing the enemy as unwise?

    He should go back and reread his own inconsistant rheteroic.

    53. "his “future war with real armies, air forces, air defenses, and naval power” will still be fought, in part, by real marines and real Airborne units."

    Its doubtful any real wars with real enemies blocking beaches and LZs will be fought by Friedman's weak USMC. Maybe sent in to be slaughtered, I wouldn't call that fighting".

    The Army Airborne will certainly fight, but it also takes TANGIBLE actions to prepare and is light on the loud mouthed trash-talk marines employ as excuses.

    54. "Not by Macgregor’s toys."

    It'd be far better to employ Macgregor's tank "toys" and prevail over the enemy with overmatch than to send in Friedman's "boys" to their deaths and maimings.

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    Replies
    1. I looked into Macgregor's background to see why he is so misinformed on all the points of his article.
      His experience is from Operation Desert Storm, and his article shows it. He seems to have dusted off an old piece that he wrote 20 years ago and published it.
      Macgregor’s article and this 54 point rant does not take into account what the majority of warfare has been, small wars with a focus on people and boots on the ground accomplish the mission.
      The only way to win a war with airpower and armor only is annihilation (accepting heavy American caused civilian causalities). There will always be a requirement for a light force to cut what the sledgehammer of armor and air could not crush.

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    2. Good grief. Is that guy done already... I'm exhausted trying to scroll past his ranting. Look buddy, this is a blog associated with the Marine Corps' professional journal. I saw a blog about Ochocinco on ESPN that seemed more your style.

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  17. From "Anonymous'" long string of rants, I would guess that he has never been employed in a joint environment, or at a COCOM.

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  18. I know that unless you sign in to the site your comments are listed as Anonymous. For the person that posted the 54 point rebuttal, not withstanding the tenor and tone, you can always add your identity.
    Semper Fi
    Colonel John Keenan USMC (Ret)

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  19. Well said, Captain Friedman.

    Often, Marines look to the Commandant or some other senior officer to respond when they read something or see a news story that's "one off."

    Friedman developed a clear-sight picture on this target and had the gumption to put his name on a response and pull the trigger.

    Well done.

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  20. Truth to tell, most foreign ISAF troops would rather work with the "useless" Marines than the Army. Not bcoz of the hype, but bcoz of the operational differences they actually saw between the grunts and the jarheads. No offense, but many Brits see the US Army as a blundering giant who somehow manages to get the job done due to sheer mass.

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