At The Basic School, almost every Marine officer has
experienced the “What now, Lieutenant?” moment. You’ve sketched out a battle
plan worthy of Rommel himself, and then a question is posed by a fellow
student, an instructor raises a quizzical eyebrow, and you find yourself
suddenly on the spot.
Lieutenant Colonel Tlapa’s recent award-winning essay Putting the “Landing Force” in Air-Sea
Battle begs a similar question.
Certainly, the essay hits all the right buzzwords; “reverse
A2/AD”, “away game”, “cross-domain synergy”, and features the obligatory
historical case study in VADM Barbery’s amphibious landing at Lae in 1943. This
case study is such an egregious case of apples and oranges that it bears
remarking on. Lieutenant Colonel Tlapa’s thesis is that a MEU can seize islands
to form “pockets of local domain superiority” but his historical case study is
of a beachhead made, not on an island, but on the coast of Papua New Guinea,
and where the landing of the Australian 9th Division, supported by Naval
gunfire from 5 destroyers was only half the story; the other half being the
immediate airborne seizure of the airfield in neighboring Nadzab by a U.S.
parachute regiment to allow the follow-on insertion of a brigade from the
Australian 7th Division by C-47 transport aircraft.
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Map of the Battle of Lae |
In the end, the defending
Japanese brigade-size force elected to withdraw rather than fight, and managed
to successfully evacuate the bulk of its combat strength; the Allied seizure of
Lae was not due to a quick in-and-out insertion of a small, hardened
MAGTF-style element, but was instead an attempted double-pincer envelopment
utilizing airborne and amphibious troops with a 3-1 numerical advantage,
supported by robust naval gunfire and air support. General McArthur and VADM
Barbery certainly did establish “local domain superiority”, but it’s hard to
see the relevance of that battle to the future operations being examined in the
essay.
Let’s examine first a key contradiction inherent in this
concept; it will supposedly create a defensive node within “the threat ring of
the adversary” that is highly reliant on use of X-band radar, in an
electromagnetic environment that is expected to be dirty; in other words, we anticipate
the opponent will be using jamming and other
countermeasures such as the Avtobaza system that Iran has alreadyacquired from Russia. These systems can both target and jam X-band fire-control
radars and disrupt missile data links. This raises a serious question about the
viability of Theater High Altitude Air Defense, (THAAD) “Iron Dome”, and Long
Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM) to function as advertised in the very
environment which Lieutenant Colonel Tlapa himself believes will exist when we
put our modified MEU ashore to create. Further, while he acknowledges early on
that “we must attain local air and sea control long enough to offload the
landing force,” he does not explain how that challenge will be resolved in an
anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) environment.
Which brings us to the next issue; actually putting a MEU
ashore on any one of the various locations suggested; the Senkakus, Paracels,
Spratlys, or one of the small islands in the Strait of Hormuz.
Let’s deal with these locations separately, starting with
the Strait of Hormuz. The islands in question, Siri, Abu Musa, Farur, and
Greater Tunb are little more than 5 miles wide, are host to Iranian military
forces, and sit well within the shadow of mainland Iranian air defense
missiles, radars, and anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) sites. So, what now,
Lieutenant Colonel? How do we put the MEU ashore into what becomes effectively
a five-mile square kill box which, in the case of Greater Tunb and Farur can
easily be covered by mainland rocket artillery such as the Fajr-3? In the
ramp-up to any offensive US actions, the Strait will likely be mined; island
garrisons will likely make sure the beaches and all mobility lanes are seeded
with IEDs or conventional anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. Assuming that
we can get the landing force ashore (and either V-22’s through the Iranian air
defense artillery network or landing craft past fast-boat swarms, submarines, ASCM,
and mines would be tricky) one then wonders - getting the MEU ashore
accomplishes what, exactly? It creates an “Iron Dome” over, well, itself. It
takes a full MAGTF out of the fight, without functionally tying up any
significant enemy force. It leaves them vulnerable to continuous pounding from
mainland rocket artillery on two islands, and (if the Iranians are smart and
position Fajr-3 or equivalent units on each of the four islands) interlocking
indirect fires from multiple directions on any of the islands. One the plus
side, it would create an “unsinkable
battleship” armed with LRASM to defeat Iranian ships out to 600 NM, which does
a nice job of covering the entire Strait – until you run out of missiles (an
8-cell launcher weighs 13 tons – empty!) Or until you run out targets worth
shooting; the Iranian Navy only has 5 frigates and 3 corvettes! Opening the
aperture, another 26 targets may present themselves if Sina and Houdong-class
missile boats are considered; the rest of its forces are either underwater, or
so small and numerous that the cost of a LRASM (which are still not operational,
despite the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Tlapa talks about “leveraging current
capacities”) would not justify a launch. Bottom line; there are cheaper, faster, less
risky ways to destroy Iranian missile boats than putting a modified MEU ashore
on a tiny island.
Now let’s make a literary “Pivot to Asia” to address the
viability of this operational concept in the South China Sea.
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Operational Concepts - OPNAVINST 5401.9 |
It’s worth
pausing to address the idea of operational concepts; they are what links
technical and tactical innovations (singly, or, quite often, combined) into a
method of achieving strategic aims. In OPNAVINST 5401.9 such concepts are
described as:
A visualization of future operations that describes how a commander,
using military art and science, might employ capabilities necessary to meet future
challenges and explore potential opportunities.
However, just as there are offensive and defensive “plays”
in most sports, so there can be operational concepts which work better in the
defense than the offense, or vice versa.
And in fact, the operational concept
which Lieutenant Colonel Tlapa proposes is quite sound; from the perspective of
the home team. In fact, a similar concept was the cornerstone of my 2011 thesis
for the Indonesian Navy’s Command and Staff College: Konsepsi Pembangunan
Postur TNI AL Masa Depan Yang Mampu Mengatasi Ancaman Maritim Guna Mendukung
Pertahanan Dan Keamanan Nasional Dalam Rangka Mewujudkan Pertahanan Regional –
English translation – “Development Concept for the Indonesian Navy to
Enable it to Overcome Future Maritime Threats to National Security in the
Framework of Developing Regional Defense.”
In that report, I explained how Indonesia (and in the
future regional partners such as neighboring Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines)
could utilize 12-15 small, strategically
placed islands armed with Akash, Mistral, and Brahmos missiles to prevent incursions by
adversary naval or air forces at a relatively low cost to equip and maintain.
Also, fairly easy to set up, and to make mutually supporting – if you emplace
them as defensive measures on your sovereign territory far in advance of any
conflict.
What Lieutenant Colonel Tlapa proposes – standing up a
single similar strongpoint, unsupported by others, in the middle of an air and
sea environment where the adversary will be dominant in one or more domains and
where there are multiple claimants to recognition under international law (none
of which includes the United States) – would be neither easy to set up nor to
maintain long enough to be strategically relevant. A good defensive play for
the home team; a terrible offensive play for the away team.
A look at the map gives us an idea why.
Take the Senkakus – the largest is less than 3 square miles
in size – and sits well within the range ring of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army’s (PLA) rocket artillery. It’s also within the air defense
range of the S-300 and S-400, both of which are owned by the Chinese, and their
diesel submarines could operate freely within our notional LRASM range ring.
Thus, aerial and surface re-supply of any forces ashore would be highly
problematic. There are slightly larger islands in the Paracels and Spratlys –
some of which are already garrisoned by PLA forces, and one can be certain that
those forces could and would be rapidly increased in the ramp-up to any
military engagement in the area.
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Range Ring of the DF-21 Missile |
These islands are safe from shorter-range
rocket artillery, but well within striking distance of the DF-21. More
problematic is the sheer number of islands in both the Paracels and Spratlys.
The MAGTF envisioned by Lieutenant Colonel Tlaba can occupy exactly one,
leaving over 30 islands (in the Paracels) or over 100 islands in the Spratly’s open for
the adversary to plant a similar force. Of course, China and several other
interested players already maintain garrisons in the Spratlys and the Paracels.
Again, the first
challenge is getting the MEU within striking distance of any of these locations
during a time of war; all the Asian navies field significant submarine forces
and most are building more. The anti-ship version of the DF-21 threatens, as do
naval mines and preponderant numbers of small vessels (122 missile boats being
the greatest threat). All the islands are well within striking range of the
Chinese air forces; the PLA-Navy can bring over 100 strike aircraft to the fight;
the PLA-Air Force could easily triple that with plenty of reserves. And of course,
this operational concept, as it is written, requires the landing force to get
ashore before it can employ any significant air-to-air or anti-ship capability.
Supposing that, by some miracle, our Marines make it ashore, and their radar is
not degraded by adversary jamming.
Now, the problem is the opposite of the Strait of Hormuz;
instead of too few good targets, they will have too many. Our THAAD missiles
may knock down 3-6 attacking aircraft before they are overwhelmed by even a
small “swarm” attack; the “Iron Dome” will take out about 20 missiles, but then
it, too, runs out of Shlitz. The notional MAGTF lacks ground-to-ground rocket
artillery to compete with anything the adversary has emplaced on any of the
many neighboring islands, and it’s clear that even if allowed ashore, it can
swiftly be wiped out by a fairly small element of a potential adversary’s
forces.
I’ll address the myth of “parity” in a future post; for now,
while I applaud Lieutenant Colonel Tlaba for putting forward an idea in support of the
Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), the fact that it was selected for the Lieutenant Colonel Earl
“Pete” Ellis award makes me wonder if senior leaders might seriously consider
it a good idea. It’s not. This might have been a revolutionary concept back
when Lieutenant Colonel Ellis was still alive; today it’s a recipe for
disaster.
Maj
Edward H. “UTAH” Carpenter is an Aviation Logistician and Foreign Area Officer.