Back to the Future Part 4: On Strategy

 

For few years now, I have been harping on the Marine Corps for its poor strategic education program. (Sorry, CG 13, EWS Class 2012-2013, I know you’re tired of this.) By poor, I do not mean that the strategic education is bad. Command and Staff College, where Marine officers receive their first real dose of strategic theory, has a great curriculum and outstanding staff. Rather, this dose of strategic theory comes far too late in an officer’s career. No tactical action exists without strategic context, but we pretend that it is not necessary or possible for an officer to understand that context until he or she is a field grade officer. This is false.

The justification for teaching officers strategic theory so late is that lieutenants and captains are not strategic leaders, they are tactical leaders. Theirs is not to question why, theirs is but to do or die, if you will. The decisions that company grade officers make on the battlefield are tactical in nature and thus strategic theory is unnecessary. It only makes sense that tactical leaders do not need strategic sense in order to make good tactical decisions.

This is right. Company grade officers are tactical leaders. But that Prussian-accented voice at the back of my mind whispers a quiet, “Nein.”

Strategy thereby gains the end it had ascribed to the [tactical] engagement, the end that constitutes its real significance… The original means of strategy is victory- that is, tactical success… Strategy, in connecting these factors with the outcome of the engagement, confers a special significance on that outcome and thereby on the engagement: it assigns a particular aim to it… Successful engagements or victories in all stages of importance may therefore be considered as strategic means… Not only individual engagements with particular aims are to be classified as means: any greater unity formed in a combination of engagements by being directed toward a common aim can also be considered as a means. - On War (Howard/Paret trans.) Pages 142-143.

What he means is that strategy determines ends and that those ends can only be accomplished through tactics. Tactics are only effective when endowed with significance that serves the strategy. A tactician must choose tactics that have that significance. Tactics that do not serve the strategy are, at best, wasteful. At worst, they are detrimental. Sun Tzu agrees: “Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.

Yet, we send lieutenants out to make tactical decisions without arming them with even the rudimentary skills necessary to give those decisions meaning. We cannot expect effective tactical decision making without strategic insight.  In fact, our doctrine depends on it. Maneuver warfare theory preaches that decision-making must be delegated to the lowest levels, that junior leaders must make their own decisions in the absence of orders or if the situation demands, that Marines must have a bias for action. This vacuum can be filled by only a few basic strategic theory classes at TBS and EWS. These basic classes would not be intended to make experts, but only to guide the self-study of those interested. On War is a mainstay on the Commandant’s Reading List, but few can pick up that tome and understand it without guidance or explanation. The Marine Corps expects every officer to conduct this self study but has yet to provide a decent guide to that study. The strategic theory forest is dark and thickly wooded, but a few chemlights along an officer’s path can do a world of good. 

To be sure, the Marine Corps is not a strategy-making body. However, the Marine Corps has a responsibility to inform those that do on tactical and operational plans. The necessity to understand strategy is clear. The Marine Corps used to understand this precept, one needs only read the first few pages of the Small Wars Manual to see that. Unfortunately, one needs only read a few pages of today’s diluted doctrine to see that it has forgotten it. Fortunately the solution to this problem is inexpensive. Since the future of the Marine Corps is one of budget austerity that looks worse all the time, education might be one of the last areas that the institution can affect. Thinking is free, after all, and adding classes on strategic theory to TBS and EWS is far more cost effective than the next leap ahead weapon system. What we cannot afford is to continue to ignore this important aspect of our profession.

Why the West is the Best

This post is part of a series highlighting books on the Commandant’s Professional Reading List in an effort to promote the study of military history and other professional subjects. This month’s selection is “Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power.” Next month’s feature is “The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and What We Can Do About It.”

Buy the book online.

For the last 2,500 years Western military forces have held the advantage when confronting non-Westerners in battle. From the Greco-Persian Wars of the 5^th Century B.C. to the modern era in which the industrialized nations of the West project military power into any corner of the world, Western military forces win far more than they lose. Some scholars, such as Jared Diamond in his landmark Guns, Germs, and Steel attribute Eurasian dominance to accidents of geography, others to technology or even morality, but in Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, Victor Davis Hanson puts forth the premise that Western military dominance springs from the cultural traditions of the Greek city-states dating back to the 7^th Century B.C.

Hanson, a noted historian, begins his work by exploring the creation of the Western cultural tradition in the rugged hills and sparse valleys of ancient Greece. He examines the Greek concept of infantry-centric shock battle in which disciplined rows of hoplites fought shoulder-to-shoulder in the great battles of Xenophon’s 10,000 and Alexander’s conquest of the Persian Empire. How was it that men, often outnumbered and far from home, could keep in disciplined ranks and advance in unison when confronting fierce warriors charging from every angle? Hanson believes the answer lies in the concept of individual and political freedom coupled with rationalism; that free citizens in a constitutional government give the West its advantage on the battlefield. From this basis comes other qualities addressed throughout the book: democracy, property rights, free speech & markets, the rule of law, individualism, dissent; all of which provide the people of a political entity, be it a city-state or a modern nation, with the belief that they make the decision to go to war and willingly send their citizens to fight in it with inherent rights and norms agreed on and adhered to throughout the conflict.

It’s an abstract idea, but Hanson strives to show a correlation between an army of free citizens and success in war. He goes on throughout the book to link the Hellenic cultural tradition to other societies and battles throughout the ages. From the Battle of Tenochtitlan through Lepanto and Rorke’s Drift to the modern clashes at Midway and the Tet Offensive, Hanson attaches offshoots of the Greek tradition to each engagement: the discipline of professional soldiers, the effect of capitalism on fielding the great weapons of war, and the role of dissent on pressuring governments to change failing strategies. These concepts are contrasted well against losing armies who fought as slaves to an emperor or with weapons based on ritualistic form instead of rational science. It would seem easy to dismiss Hanson’s work as deterministic or even racist, but he strives to avoid leveling judgment, although he certainly leaves room for one to draw the misguided conclusion that all nations should embrace the Western cultural tradition and perhaps by extension that the U.S. should crusade for that end as a matter of policy.

While Western nations have a strong record of military dominance, it is not immune from disaster (the Anglo-Afghan War, the Russo Japanese War and of course Dien Bien Phu just to name a few). Nation-states and non-state actors across the world study and adapt not just the Western way of war, but many are moving towards the Western cultural tradition, or like China’s blend of socialism and capitalism, are displaying a hybrid of both Western and Eastern traditions. Hanson believes that these traits are both enduring and universal; therefore they can be used or discarded by any military force or society. Therein lies the reason that military professionals need to read and study this book. Marines should ask themselves if they are emulating the qualities that Hanson notes as decisive in enabling victory in battle. Is constructive dissent within your unit encouraged or viewed as a threat? Is discipline applied with room for individual initiative to be applied in the fog of war? These and other points raised in the book are worth considering for leaders of Marines. A study guide is posted at the MCU website and a debate between Victor Davis Hanson and Jared Diamond is on YouTube and will add to your understanding of the central ideas in their works. Please leave a comment if you do or do not recommend this book for others to read.

Back to the Future Part 3: Amphibious Raiding

This post is part of a series that will continue over the course of the next few months. The series will look at the future of the Marine Corps after the end of Operating Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. It was inspired by Robert Kosloski’s article in the Naval War College Review, “Marching Towards the Sweet Spot: Options for the Marine Corps in a Time of Austerity,” (Available Here) Mr. Kosloski has also written for this blog. It will include guest posts and posts by Gazette blog authors. This series is being organized by Capt Jonathan Rue, USMCR, who writes at Gunpowder and Lead and the Guardian, and Capt Brett Friedman, USMC, who writes here and at Grand Blog Tarkin.

A few years ago, when I was working on a two-star staff, I was told by a high-level GS employee and retired USMC field grade officer that "the Marine Corps doesn’t do raiding anymore.”

For a while there he was probably right. After the Mayaguez incident, it seemed like raids were destined to pass to into the realm of special operations despite the Marines' long history of maritime raids. The Marine Corps’ first amphibious assault was conducted as part of a raid to secure military supplies from the British on New Providence in the Bahamas. This raid also included sailors armed and sent ashore with the Marine contingents. With support from sailors, the Marine corps regularly conducted raids until World War I. They were so ingrained in the Corps that the Commandant, in an attempt to emulate British commandos, established the Marine Raiders during World War II. The Raiders were the first unit to conduct a maritime raid via submarine and won further laurels behind Japanese lines on Guadalcanal.

Raiding, however, appears to be on the horizon yet again. The Navy-Marine Corps team is looking at putting Marine detachments on a variety of platforms besides amphibious ships, a call that has also appeared in the print edition of the Marine Corps Gazette. Adding to the desire for Marines aboard more ships are those that appeal for more options in how those Marines are employed. In February 2012, LCDR BJ Armstrong called for Marine raiding forces on aircraft carriers:

Today’s Nimitz -class aircraft carriers are not being used for maximum efficiency. While the “fighter gap” is not projected to hit the Navy for another couple of years, the reality is that today’s carrier air wing is smaller than the Nimitz class was designed to deploy. The Gerald R. Ford class will have even more room. The power of today’s super carriers comes from the precision fires that can be delivered more than the sheer number of airframes on the flight deck. This leaves room available for a few more airframes and a few more people, and the potential to increase the capability of the modern carrier strike group.

LCDR Armstrong makes a great case that a contingent of Marines (like Company Landing Force as he mentions in the article) would vastly increase the flexibility of the Carrier Strike Group. Even if the Marines were focused on the simpler NEO (Noncombatant Evacuation Operation) and TRAP (Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel) missions, their presence would give combatant commanders more options.

Another possibility is to return Marines to the undersea realm.

If an ARG is too far off the coast to launch landing craft and the AA threat makes air operations too dangerous for non-stealth aircraft, how will the Joint Force, specifically the Marine Corps component, seize lodgments in support of other operations? The answer: through America’s principal 21st-century naval advantage­—submarines....… The (current) amphibious capability of both SSNs and SSGNs revolves around the dry deck shelter (DDS)—a 38-foot long, 30-ton, C-5–transportable sphere that attaches to a submarine. An SSN can accommodate one shelter; an SSGN can carry two. Marines enter the DDS while the submarine is submerged. The shelter is then flooded and the water pressure inside equalized to the outside environment. The DDS then opens and the Marines surface.

To be sure, the SEALs also utilize this capability. But for a time and place that requires more schlitz than stealth, it would be a good idea for Marines to have units ready to execute a raid via submarine. This capability may be especially important when facing an A2AD system.

Whether the raiders consist of Marines, special operations forces, or soldiers, the U.S. Navy is the single most capable raiding platform on the planet. A raid launched from US ships afloat requires less coordination with host nations, if it requires any at all, and is less of a burden on our partners. Without offshore Navy assets, raids must be facilitated by local airfields and other infrastructure. The Bin Laden raid, which may now be the most famous raid in history, was made possible by Coalition airfields and bases in neighboring Afghanistan, an aspect we may not always have in the future. Raids will also look more attractive to policymakers who want to avoid costly, long-term occupations like Iraq and Afghanistan. Far from being a lapsed capability from a distant past, the maritime raid may make a comeback.

Modern Day Relevance in Classic Military Literature

-->

This entry is the first in a series of posts that will highlight books on the Commandant’s Professional Reading List in an effort to promote the study of military history and other professional subjects. This month’s selection is “The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War”. Next month’s feature is “Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power.”  This post was co-authored with Brad Fultz.

The world looks at the leading democratic power not as a source of inspiration or with feelings of kinship. Indeed, it seems that most of the world sees a threat-a global power determined to rule as an empire not based on democracy or any other altruistic reasons, but through the application of unchecked power to protect first and foremost its own interests. Anyone who stands in the way will be crushed.

And why not? This is an appropriate role for the dominant power in a loose, unipolar world. After all this country was responsible for the defeat of the “Evil Empire” to the East that ushered in “an end to history” where under its democratic leadership the world would cooperate to ensure the free flow of commerce and ideas. Treaties established trade linkages justifying the most powerful navy in the history of the world to keep open. The year is 433 B.C.-the democracy is Athens and one of the greatest wars in history is about to begin.     

As military professionals we are often at the forefront in the effort to work through a growing list of complex issues such as the nature of the international system, alliance building and maintenance, grand strategy, the operational level of war, and conflict termination.  By studying one of the most enduring works of history, Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, we can examine the unchanging nature of human political, economic, and military interactions.

Thucydides’ account is brilliant in its sweep and analysis.  The work is not simply a re-telling of one battle after the other, but offers a holistic view by focusing on the geo-political, economic, and other strategic elements of this civil war that lasted for almost 30 years. While reading this book I was struck by the transformation of a limited war into a total war and the failure of both sides to end hostilities despite numerous treaties. While the Spartans would eventually claim victory, both sides were so devastated that Greek power would never recover.

I also could not help but marvel at the arc of Athenian democracy presented by Thucydides. In Book One he discusses the evolution of Athens from city-state to the dominant force in the Mediterranean after the defeat of the Persians. In the Funeral Oration of Pericles in Book Two, one of the most famous passages in Western history, Thucydides records Pericles’ words at the end of the first year of war in which he eloquently and passionately describes the qualities that make Athens so great. With a modern update the speech could be made in the halls of Congress today.  As the war progresses over the years though the very nature of the Athenian state slowly devolves from Pericles’ ideal city on a hill to an international bully as depicted in the Melian Dialogue in Book Five. The Athenians offer the small and neutral island of Melos a stark choice, submit to Athens or be destroyed. In contrast to the rule of law stressed by Pericles the Melians are presented with an arbitrary decision-they refuse and are crushed.

As with America’s position after World War II, Athens came to dominate not only Greece but also the entire Mediterranean world. It was dependent on its strong navy to secure alliances and the resources needed to sustain its hegemony and evolved from a city-state to an empire. In a classic security dilemma, Athenian power, while saving the Greeks from Persian invasions led to resentment and fear of her unchecked power by other Greeks, particularly Sparta. This sets the stage for several decades of internecine war in which the account of Thucydides covers the most decisive phase. As we consider the nature of our own country, both in our foundational belief in democracy and our rise to power in the world, there is much we can learn today from the Peloponnesian War.

While this book is listed under the “Senior Level: Colonel to General” it would be a mistake to wait that long to tackle this book. If one waits until they are an O-6, too many of our thought leaders, be they on a Division or MARFOR staff, will miss the opportunity to study one of the great works of political-military history. Any O-4 who has completed Command and Staff College or the equivalent professional military education should read this book to reinforce the political and strategic subjects covered during the course.  

Noting that this is perhaps one of the most challenging books on the Professional Reading List we thought it would be helpful if we shared some of our best practices in getting through it as well as a discussion guide which is available on the MCU website (discussion guides for other reading list books are also here). We hope you will endeavor to tackle this exceptional work-it’s worth it.

Back to the Future Part 2

This post is part of a series that will continue over the course of the next few months. The series will look at the future of the Marine Corps after the end of Operating Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. It was inspired by Robert Kosloski’s article in the Naval War College Review, “Marching Towards the Sweet Spot: Options for the Marine Corps in a Time of Austerity,” (Available Here) Mr. Kosloski has also written for this blog. It will include guest posts and posts by Gazette blog authors. This series is being organized by Capt Jonathan Rue, USMCR, who writes at Gunpowder and Lead and the Guardian, and Capt Brett Friedman, USMC, who writes here and at Grand Blog Tarkin.

Even before the Marine Corps began drawing down forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) began planning for a post-Afghanistan future. Concerned that a decade of inland ground combat operations left the USMC vulnerable to the charge of being a “second land army,” and thus a redundant and unnecessary Department of Defense asset, HQMC leadership began to seek ways to ensure that such a charge could not stick.

Naturally, the first response was to seek ways of returning to our amphibious roots as the USMC has primary responsibility for amphibious operations as stated in Title 10. Then Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) Gen James Conway released a message to all Marines in Summer 2008 calling on Marines to reestablish their traditional role as fighters from the sea. The current CMC Gen James Amos has continued the emphasis on amphibious operations, most recently penning an article with the Chief of Naval Operations continuing the theme and backing up words with actions like reconstituting the Bold Alligator amphibious exercise series.

But amphibious operations aren’t an end unto itself; it’s simply the vehicle (no pun intended) through which the USMC traditionally deploys assets. The end state for the Marine Corps, and what has always set us apart from the Army and other services, is our higher “proportionate emphasis on rapid mobility.” In Marine speak, this means the Marine Corps is “America’s expeditionary force-in-readiness; in civilian speak, it means being the nation’s 9-1-1 force.

Although many commentators and analysts see this as a new role for the USMC, it’s actually one that the Marine Corps has fulfilled for 15o years. Since the end of the Civil War, the USMC has been the go-to force when U.S. embassies around the world are threatened. Between 1865 and 1900, the Marine Corps participated in over 30 foreign interventions, including expeditions to secure embassies in Korea and Japan, and anti-slavery operations off the coast of Western Africa. This first era of Marine response force missions culminated in the relief of the foreign embassies in Beijing, China during the Boxer Rebellion.

The Navy-Marine Corps team might be the most well-known, but equally as important is the Marine Corps partnership with the U.S. Department of State. Part of being the nation’s 9-1-1 force means rapidly deploying to locations where DoD has no major presence. In such places, it’s a safe bet that State Department Foreign Service Officers are serving alongside Marine Embassy Security Guards. Acting as the State Department’s Army is also not a new mission for the Marine Corps.

Although we suspect this shift back to the future is more a response to stimuli like the attack on the Benghazi consulate and threats to various other embassies than it was a pre-planned strategy on the part of HQMC, the results remain the same. The Marine Corps isexpanding its capability to deploy Embassy guards and there is even a new proto-MAGTF that maximizes responsiveness at the expense of firepower. The concept, tailor made for AFRICOM, has only recently been announced but there is already talk that SOUTHCOM will be the next to get one and PACOM is interested too.

Part of being a 9-1-1 force, however, means a robust forward deployed presence in order to conduct Phase 0 and steady state operations. Deployments will not end with OEF; in fact, they will increase above what was typical for the pre-2001 Marine Corps. In addition to normal MEU commitments, the Marine Corps will have to source units for Australia, the new MAGTF-CR units, and more robust theater security cooperation plans for the combatant commands. HQMC will need to take a look at the end strength requirements needed to sustain the new deployment cycle with an appropriate dwell time and a minimal supporting establishment focused solely on training and education.

Still, in order to seamlessly capitalize on this back to the future moment, the Marine Corps will need to retool training and education of Marine officers and recruits. The officer and NCO corps possesses a totality of combat experience not seen in a generation, but some skills, like amphibious operations, atrophied, while others, working alongside civilians, was developed ad hoc and not institutionalized.

HQMC must refocus training and education on the naval aspects of amphibious operations. Certain aspects, such as the aforementioned Bold Alligator exercise, are necessary, but not sufficient in and of themselves to refocus Marine culture. Marine Corps schools are still largely focused on land warfare. Except for the Expeditionary Warfare School, they are ignoring the naval aspects of amphibious operations. This clashes with the Single Naval Battle concept espoused by the Ellis Group. The naval “blindspot” in the current Marine Corps culture will have to be illuminated as an essential aspect of a renewed focus on amphibious operations.

Meanwhile, a decade of counterinsurgency operations gave Marines an unprecedented level of exposure to working alongside civilians. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Marines worked alongside and supported civilians from the State Department, US Agency for International Development, the intelligence community, and non-governmental organizations. But such experience wasn’t taught nor institutionalized at the training and education level. HQMC should rethink joint operations[1] to include our civilian partners.

In conclusion, the trends visible during OEF and OIF will not end in a post-OEF world, they will continue. The threat of terrorism, the ability to work better with civilian partners, and the "small wars" skills gained will remain. Meanwhile two traditional Marine Corps strengths will see renewed focus: amphibious operations and crisis response. A future filled with irregular enemies, heavy State Department involvement, and rapid response to far flung corners of the globe is a lot like our past, hence the name of this series. We've been here before.

---

[1] Eric Chase, “Rethinking Joint,” Marine Corps Gazette, March 2013.

Back to the Future Part One

This post is part of a series that will continue over the course of the next few months. The series will look at the future of the Marine Corps after the end of Operating Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. It was inspired by Robert Kosloski’s article in the Naval War College Review, “Marching Towards the Sweet Spot: Options for the Marine Corps in a Time of Austerity,” (Available Here) Mr. Kosloski has also written for this blog. It will include guest posts and posts by Gazette blog authors. This series is being organized by Capt Jonathan Rue, USMCR, who writes at Gunpowder and Lead and the Guardian, and Capt Brett Friedman, USMC, who writes here and at Grand Blog Tarkin.

As mentioned above, this series of posts will look at the future of the Marine Corps, specifically some of the points brought up by Mr. Kosloski in his article. The most interesting section of the article, in my opinion, is the section on restructuring the operating forces. I wrote about this as well on this very blog in January of 2012. The next month, Paul Stokes did too. More recently, Capt Joseph Mazzara has looked at how small the Marine Corps might get, here and here. In the article, Kosloski quotes then Undersecretary of the Navy Robert Work:

By layering standing MAGTF headquarters over their old organizational structures, the Marines paid a heavy price in staff overhead. In 1989, for example, there were headquarters for Atlantic and Pacific Marine forces, three large MEFs, six MEBs [Marine Expeditionary Brigades], and seven MEUs. These were in addition to the three Division, Wing, and three Force Service Support Group headquarters, giving the Corps a total of 50 higher unit headquarters!

While higher headquarters staffs play a vital role, they are not so vital that their duplication is an efficient use of resources. This is especially true for a service that claims to be the “leanest and meanest” of the four. It is understandable how this bifurcated structure came about. It was easier to sell the MAGTF to senior leaders when the legacy organizations would remain. Now though, we use those legacy organizations as a crutch. We may fight as MAGTFs, but we don’t train as them outside of predeployment training and we certainly don’t administer ourselves as MAGTFs. When units are not in rotation for a MEU, they slough off the “MAGTFery” skin and revert to legacy organizations. This flies in the face of our claim that we train how we fight: we don’t. The legacy higher headquarters structures are only necessary to support a training environment that clashes with the Marine Corps preferred combat organization.

The debate over whether the Marine Corps should look at a significant effort at restructuring may well be academic. The future fiscal environment will more than likely force the Marine Corps to improve its structure, whether it wants to or not. This will require more than the sclerotic Force Structure Review Group and the Force Organization Review Group spawned by the former’s failure. Cutting and improving an organization as large as the Marine Corps simultaneously cannot be done in pieces and parts. Rather, the whole organization must be assessed and evaluated based on lessons learned. Such a review would look more like the Hogaboom Report than the FSRG- an ad hoc group of voluntold Marines and civilians.

The MAGTF has proven itself in modern warfare, there is little reason to believe that legacy organizations- holdovers from Napoleonic warfare - are best suited for the training and administration tasks that have fallen to them when not part of a MAGTF. We even use legacy warfighting organization for units in the supporting forces like TECOM and MCCDC (an issue I’ll be taking on in a future print article). Whether Kosloski’s proposal for vertical and horizontal realignment is the best for the future of the Marine Corps is a discussion worth having. However, it seems clear that the Marine Corps is long overdue for a change. The MAGTF is, along with the fire team, a uniquely Marine Corps contribution to how military force is organized. Now that is has a decades-long track record, it’s high time to abandon the vestigial organizations still present.