In this recent
article on AOL Defense, Frank Hoffman discusses hybrid warfare and AirSea
Battle. In the course of the article, he seems to say that the major defect in
the US military is a lack of communications connectivity or a “network.”
"Warfare's all about asymmetries, trying to find a competitive advantage, hopefully enduring," said Hoffman. For the US, that edge may be the ability to link its own forces together in an all-service network of systems – especially unmanned ones, not just in the air but on the water and the ground – while attacking the enemy's less-sophisticated network with both new cyber-weapons and traditional electronic warfare tools like jamming.
Today, "it's definitely networks and linkages that are missing," said Hoffman, especially between the services and between such traditionally unconnected combat arms as aircraft and submarines. In the future, "we're going to probably have fewer platforms" – ships, planes, tanks – "but they're going to be better networked, better integrated," Hoffman said. "That's where the greatest investment should probably go."
I’m skeptical that the lack of a network,
in the physical, communications infrastructure sense is that big of an
advantage or disadvantage for the US military. We’ve had communication infrastructure
in place for decades, and I personally have never had a technological problem
with communicating with other branches. There are other problems though. Time
for a story.
In 2008 in Diyala, I was involved in the
planning and post-operation AAR of a small scale helo assault operation. The
operation involved Army rotary wing assets, Army infantry forces, Iraqi Army infantry
forces with Marine advisors, and Air Force rotary assets. The helo assault went
smoothly and the objective was reached. Subsequently, seven “squirters” left
the objective, a small village, and hunkered down outside it. The Army ground
forces were sent to investigate the seven men and were talked on to their
position by an Air Force helo pilot who had eyes on their position. The soldiers
approached the seven men in a column formation. When the Army squad reached the
seven men, they pulled small arms from underneath their bodies and ambushed
them, causing two KIA and pinning down the squad. The Army squad alerted the
Iraqi forces through the Marine advisors, and the IA forces maneuvered on the
rear of the enemy ambush, killing some and causing the rest to flee. Subsequent
viewing of the aerial footage revealed that the seven enemy were arrayed along
a road in a classic linear ambush formation. Any of the ground forces involved,
if they had seen the footage, would have instantly recognized it as such. The
Air Force pilot, unfortunately, did not and walked the infantry squad right
into the kill zone of the ambush.
I tell this story not to knock the Air
Force or the pilot, who was never trained in small unit tactics and could not
have recognized the ambush. Rather, it illustrates that what is missing from
our “network” may not be the technology necessary to communicate with each
other, but rather the context needed to understand each
other. Information could easily be passed between the Air Force pilot and the
Army infantryman in real time. What was missing was a common frame of reference
to match the pilot’s interpretation with the infantryman’s knowledge to produce
recognition of the situation. The pilot probably said something like, “Seven suspicious
men to your Northeast.” If the pilot instead had said, “Seven men in a linear
ambush formation along the road to your Northeast” that would have triggered,
in the infantryman’s mind, a different course of action. If the Army squad had
reached the enemy in a squad online or squad V formation, the result would have
been drastically different. Basically, two US personnel were speaking different
languages which led to tragedy.
Theories like Network-Centric Warfare that
have a heavy focus “networking” US forces make two false assumptions. One is
that networked forces will have access to all the required information needed to
operate. Perfect information is, of course, impossible. Second, they assume
that information will be interpreted the same way between units. As long as
wars are fought by humans, this will never be true. While a highly advanced
network that integrates all US military forces would certainly be beneficial,
it is not THE answer and will not necessarily lead to superiority over enemy
forces. Increased information would also have drawbacks. In this instance, if
the squad had a screen where he could view the aerial footage from the helo, he
would have had better situational awareness and certainly would have changed
his approach. However, while he was focused on watching a screen, he would lose
focus on his immediate surroundings. The trade off would have been beneficial
in this case where the area was secure accept for the seven enemy in question,
but that would not be the case in every situation. Getting more information to
the troops on the ground can lead to information overload or distraction and an
internal focus vice an external focus.
A truly networked force would not just have
the means to communicate with any other unit, but would also need a common
operating picture with which to process the information that it receives. Our
individual frames of reference are influenced by experience, training, service
doctrine, education, culture, and a myriad of other sources. Since those
influences will never be the same for any two people, we should not put too
much hope in advanced networks as a guarantor of victory.
I believe that Brett Friedman's comments are on time and on target. Throughout my 35+ years of service I have seen "miscommunications" like these result in a wide variety of events that ranged from simple misunderstandings to the needless lost of life.
ReplyDeleteThe Basic Principle of Net-Centric Warfare of: "If everyone has the same image/information, they will all come to the same conclusions" is fundamentally flawed because human beings simply don't think /react that way. Which is why Honest, Aggressive, Clear-Headed and Pragmatic Leadership can never replace the latest New-fangled Supersonic Whiz-bang Automated Lawnmower (NeSWAL) that is "guaranteed" by the vendor to clear-away "The Fog of War".
Ergo, as Leaders, we must do our utmost "To Train Our Men As Team" as well use approved Joint/Coalition Operational Teams in order to reduce/if not eliminate any misunderstandings both in garrison and/or deployed environments.
Tien len! Muon Doc Lap Phai Do Mau! & Semper Fi MaC!
Paul
Major Paul Stokes USMC, Retired
Director of Operations
Marine Corps Communications-Electronics School