Deception in Air-Sea Battle

Captain Brett Friedman has written on this blog several good pieces on Air-Sea Battle (ASB).  In my personal favorite, he describes how ASB falsely promises the US military a strategic victory over an enemy by using air and sea power to defeat our enemy.  He brings in historical examples of the US using air and sea forces to reduce shore-based defenses, like Operation OVERLORD, or the Battle of Iwo Jima, two battles where the shore defenses were hardly affected by the Air-Sea Battle conducted prior to amphibious landings. While the ends of the preparatory fires before Iwo Jima and the D-Day assault were different from ASB, the idea that is promoted is the same:  Air and Sea power are the “be all, end all” of war.  As Capt Friedman puts it, "[I]t was assumed, by the US Navy as late as 1943 and the US Army in 1944, that air and sea firepower would negate shore defenses. ASB is built around this same assumption, an assumption proven false sixty-nine years ago."



For those unfamiliar with ASB, here is a concise definition from Greg Jaffe at the Washington Post: 

"Stealthy American bombers and submarines would knock out China’s long-range surveillance radar and precision missile systems located deep inside the country. The initial “blinding campaign” would be followed by a larger air and naval assault."

To expand the meaning in the Washington Post: After the preparatory bombardment allows our air and naval forces to approach an enemy’s territory at ever decreasing ranges,  these forces will continue to destroy strategic targets without fear of retaliation by the previously destroyed radar and precision mission systems until our enemy capitulates, like Japan after the atomic bomb.  This plan is not about achieving air and sea dominance, ASB is about beginning the war, conducting the war, and ending the war from the Air and from the Sea. 

A key part of this plan involves us owning longer ranged and more accurate missiles than the Chinese, and their inability to defend against them.  We would use them to attack key targets (command & control and air defense sites) on our enemy's soil, probably China, as suggested by the post article quoted above.  As long as we continue pouring money into acquiring the necessary technology, we'll be able to continue to stand off further and further from our enemy, while maintaining the accuracy of a point-blank shot. 

But what happens if they don't surrender after aerial and naval bombardment? Then as Capt Friedman detailed in the post I’ve just linked to, we will go in with ground troops and prosecute a land war, crossing our fingers that the ASB was effective in destroying at least their shore defenses. 

Let's conceive a scenario, picturing what might happen in the unlikely event we were actually assaulting China itself:  We've attacked their shore defenses, and what missile and radar capabilities they have inland, but the Chinese haven't capitulated.  So we begin to put our amphibious forces ashore.  As we're attacking, conducting OMFTS, we'll probably be asking ourselves, "Why didn't they surrender?  Our theory of ASB seemed so good!" 

One answer to that question is, "Perhaps the Chinese systems we destroyed are fakes, and decoys, and they are waiting for us to hit their killzone. Maybe because of these decoys, we only achieved a percentage reduction in what otherwise was a robust network of air and coastal defense."

I don't think this answer is that outside the ordinary.  After all, it is likely the Chinese have correctly assumed that the US is watching them, and that we possess all kinds of strategic and operational surveillance capabilities feeding us information on their military sites.  What happens to ASB if the Chinese have not only considered, but done something about the reality of American surveillance?  There exists a possibility that they’d assess themselves using their own surveillance capability.  At this point, they may have turned their own capability on themselves in order to gauge the visual, IR, and other tell-tale signals their defense facilities emit.  Why wouldn’t they use this data to create accurate decoy targets for our missiles?   

Difficult and expensive?  Maybe.  Impossible?  No.  Likely?  Well, if you saw this as the optimal way to survive a campaign of  sea-launched cruise missiles (Tomahawks) and a strategic bombing campaign by your strongest enemy, yes.  The Japanese used dummy tanks for deception on Iwo Jima to hinder the effectiveness of our naval and aerial bombardments, the British used them in Northern Africa against the Germans and Italians, and even now the United States is known to possess a dummy version of the Abrams that imitates not only the appearance but also the heat signature of our tank of choice.  It seems reasonable to assume the Chinese would attempt something similar with mock facilities.

To continue with the above scenario, our forces are now in the attack, and the Chinese didn’t surrender.  We get within range of their missile defense system, which the Chinese are only now gearing up to use, and  it appears that not only our amphibious, but also our naval and air forces will be facing an unpleasant and unexpected challenge, looking down the barrel of our enemy’s guns.